TALK AND ACTION


TALK AND ACTION





In speaking to one another, we make use of sentences, or, to be more precise, utterances. We can attempt to classify these utterances in any one of a variety of ways. We can try to classify them by grammatical structure, e.g., their clausal type and complexity: active–passive; statement–question– request–exclamatory; various combinations of these; and so on.

                We may even try to work out a semantic or logical structure for each utterance. But it is also possible to attempt a classification in terms of what sentences do, i.e., to take a ‘functional’ approach, but one that goes somewhat beyond consideration of such functions as stating, questioning, requesting, and exclaiming.

Through conversation we establish relationships with others, achieve a measure of cooperation, keep open for further relationships, and so on. The utterances we use in conversation enable us to do these kinds of things because conversation itself has certain properties which are well worth examining. Our concern in this chapter is therefore twofold: we will be concerned both with what utterances do and how they can be used, and, specifically, with how we use them in conversation.

One thing that many utterances do is make propositions: they do this mainly in the form of either statements or questions but other grammatical forms are also possible. Each of the following is a proposition: ‘I had a busy day today,’ ‘Have you called your mother?,’ and ‘Your dinner’s ready!’ Such utterances are connected in some way with events or happenings in a possible world, i.e., one that can be experienced or imagined, a world in which such propositions can be said to be either true or false. They have been called constractive utterances.

Austin (1975), a philosopher, distinguished still another kind of utterance that is the performative utterance. In using a performative utterance, a person is not just saying something but is actually doing something if certain real-world conditions are met. To say ‘I name this ship “Liberty Bell”’ in certain circumstances is to name a ship.

In general, the spoken part of the total act, the actual speech act, will take the grammatical form of having a first person subject and a verb in the present tense; it may or may not also include the word hereby. Examples are ‘I (hereby) name,’ ‘We decree,’ and ‘I swear.’ This kind of utterance is explicitly performative when it is employed in a conventional framework, such as naming ships, making royal proclamations, and taking an oath in court.

There are also less explicit performatives. Declarations like ‘I promise,’ ‘I apologize,’ or ‘I warn you’.  for anyone can promise, apologize, and warn, and there is no way of specifying the circumstances quite so narrowly. What we can observe, then, is that, in contrast to constative utterances, that is, utterances which are often used to assert propositions and which may be true or false, they are used either appropriately or inappropriately and, if used appropriately, their very utterance is the doing of the whole or part of an action.

Speech act is an act that the speaker performs making an utterance. There are some acts conditions in speech; (1) Locutionary act is the statement having grammatical structure and linguistic meaning, (2) Illocutionary act is the speaker intension of the utterance, (3) Perlocutionary act is the effects of the utterance on the hearer, (4) Felicity conditions are necessary conditions to make successful of speech acts, (5) Prepositional contain is the utterance produced if the composer commits himself to be a future act, (6) Preparatory condition is the utterance produced if speaker believes that the listener will not perform the act without being asked, (7) Sincerity  condition is the utterance produced if the speaker wants the listener to do what the speaker has been asked, and (8) Essential condition is the utterance produced if the speaker show to listener that he really wants to persuade and does what he wants to listener.

Austin divides performatives into five categories:

 (1) verdictives

 (2) exercitives

(3) commissives

 (4) behabitives

  (5) expositives

According to Searle (1969), we perform different kinds of acts when we speak. There are utterance acts, propositional acts and illocutionary acts.

Cooperation

According to philosophers such as Grice, we are able to converse with one another because we recognize common goals in conversation and specific ways of achieving these goals. In any conversation, only certain kinds of ‘moves’ are possible at any particular time because of the constraints that operate to govern exchanges.

Grice lists four maxims that follow from the cooperative principle:

       Quantity

       Quality

       Relation

       manner

Conversation

Speech can be planned or unplanned (Ochs, 1979). We should note that a lot of speech has a certain amount of planning in it: : it may not be all thought out and carefully planned and even rehearsed, as, for example, is the welcoming speech of a visiting head of state. Unplanned speech is talk which is not thought out prior to its expression. Unplanned speech has certain characteristics: repetitions; simple active sentences. i.e., words and expressions such as well, like, maybe, but, sort of, you know, I guess, etc.

Conversation is a cooperative activity also in the sense that it involves two or more parties, each of whom must be allowed the opportunity to participate.

Boxer (2002) provides a very short conversation that illustrates many of the points just made. Two female students pass each other on campus on the way to class:

       A: Hey, how are you doing?

       B: Fine, how about you? Going to class?

       A: Calculus, I hate it! (keeps moving)

       B: Ugh! Well, catch you later.

       A: Yeah, see you at the meeting.

However, there are conversational settings that are unusual in still other ways. Because of the way in which certain of the principles are used, particular types of conversation may be given quite specific names: for example, teaching, interviewing, or interrogating.

Classroom conversation is different from ordinary conversation in the sense that the teacher may be said to ‘own’ the conversation, whereas in ordinary conversations such ownership may be said to be shared.

Conversations must also be brought to a close, e.g., an exchange of ‘Goodbye’s. It is into such places that you fit pre-closing signals which serve to negotiate the actual closing. Such signals can involve an expression like ‘Well, I think that’s all,’

The following is an example of such a closing:

       A: So, that’s agreed?

       B: Yep, agreed.

       A: Good, I knew you would.

       B: Yes, no problem really.

       A: Thanks for the help.

       B: Don’t mention it.

       A: Okay, I’ll be back soon.

       B: Okay, then, Bye. Take care.

       A: Bye.

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